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Notes
U.C.C. SECTION 2-326(3): CREDITOR
PROTECTION IN THE DEEMED SALE OR
RETURN TRANSACTION
Consignment transactionspresent unique obstacles to a creditor seeking to satisfy
claims against the consignor-debtor. The Uniform Commercial Code's approach to
theproblem was to protect creditors who rely on the consignee's ostensible ownership
ofgoods in the latter'spossession. U. C C § 2-326 hasproduced a variety of confus-
ing judicial interpretations, the most recent being Walter E. Heller & Co. S.E. v.
Riviana Foods, Inc. This Note explores the basic problem of satisfying a claim
against consined property. After an analysis of the U C C approach, with special
emphasis on its construction in Riviana, the Note concludes that mod#Fcaion of
§ 2-326 is needed to restore stability in the consignment area.
INTRODUCTION
THE LAW OF consignment has long been problematical,'largely because there is no precise and functional legal defini-
tion of the term.2 As commonly used, a consignment embodies
the transfer of "merchandise into the hands of another party for
ultimate movement to a consumer-purchaser."' Since this
description is vague enough to apply to myriad transactions, the
prevailing confusion in the area is not surprising.
The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. or Code) attempted
to clarify the murky consignment area4 in section 2-326.1 The
purpose of this section is to protect the creditors of those who re-
ceive goods in the absence of an actual sale on the principle that,
1. As one commentator has noted, "[flew widely used commercial devices have had
so checkered and volatile a legal history as the consignment. And few such devices have
been able to survive so long and tortuous a legal history and yet retain so many elements of
confusion and disarray." Harrington, The Law of Consignments: Antitrust and Commercial
Pitfalls, 34 Bus. LAw. 431, 431 (1979).
2. See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
3. [3A Sales & Bulk Transfers] BENDER'S U.C.C. SERV. (MB) § 11.03[1], at 11-12
(1982) [hereinafter cited as BENDER].
4. But see infra note 10.
5. U.C.C. § 2-326 (1978) provides as follows:
Sale on Approval and Sale or Return, Consignment Sales and Rights of Creditors
(1) Unless otherwise agreed, if delivered goods may be returned by the buyer
even though they conform to the contract, the transaction is
(a) a "sale on approval" if the goods are delivered primarily for use, and
(b) a "sale or return" if the goods are delivered primarily for resale.
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lacking objective evidence to the contrary, one may reasonably
assume that all goods in the debtor's possession are unencum-
bered.6 Specifically, in addition to providing for the sale on ap-
proval7 and sale or return8 transactions, the Code treats a
consignment as a "deemed sale or return" transaction in section
2-326(3). 9
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), goods held on approval are not sub-
ject to the claims of the buyer's creditors until acceptance; goods held on sale or
return are subject to such claims while in the buyer's possession.
(3) Where goods are delivered to a person for sale and such person maintains
a place of business at which he deals in goods of the kind involved, under a name
other than the name of the person making delivery, then with respect to claims of
creditors of the person conducting the business the goods are deemed to be on
sale or return. The provisions of this subsection are applicable even though an
agreement purports to reserve title to the person making delivery until payment
or resale or uses such words as "on consignment" or "on memorandum." How-
ever, this subsection is not applicable if the person making delivery
(a) complies with an applicable law providing for a consignor's interest or the
like to be evidenced by a sign, or
(b) establishes that the person conducting the business is generally known by
his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others, or
(c) complies with the filing provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions
(Article 9).
(4) Any "or return" term of a contract for sale is to be treated as a separate
contract for sale within the statute of frauds section of this Article (Section 2-201)
and as contradicting the sale aspect of the contract within the provisions of this
Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202).
6. See id. § 2-326(l)(a) for the definition of "sale on approval" Goods thus trans-
ferred are not subject to the claims of buyer's creditors. Id. § 2-326(2).
7. A "sale or return" transaction is separately defined at id. § 2-326(l)(b). Goods
delivered to another under this arrangement are subject to buyer's creditors' claims while
in the buyer's possession. Id. § 2-326(2).
8. A number of features distinguish the "deemed sale or return" or consignment
transaction from the "sale or return" and "sale" transactions. For a brief look at these
distinctions, see generally Note, Commercial Transactions: Consignors, Creditors and the
U.C.C., 19 OKLA. L. REV. 407,407-10 (1966). U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1978) defines a "sale" as
"the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price. . . .' Of particular impor-
tance in these three situations is the determination of the party that is to bear the risk of
loss should the goods be damaged, attached by a creditor, or otherwise impaired prior to
"sale" but while in the possession of someone other than the creditor. See BENDER, supra
note 3, § 11.04, at 11-55, 11-56; Note, Sale or Return v. Consignment-The Intention of the
Parties is No Longer Determinative of the Issue, 24 BAYLOR L. REv. 288, 288-89 (1972).
Thus, inasmuch as three wholly separate legal operations are involved, only those U.C.C.
sections that were intended to cover a given transaction should be applied to the circum-
stances of a particular case. Eg., American Nat'l Bank v. Christensen, 28 Colo. App. 501,
476 P.2d 281 (1970) ("consignment" exceptions of U.C.C. § 2-326(3) held not applicable to
a sale or return under U.C.C. § 2-326(1)).
9. As one court observed, "[tihe purpose of [U.C.C. § 2-326(3)] is'to protect the credi-
tors of the consignee who would have a right to assume the goods were the property of the
consignee." American Nat'l Bank v. Quad Constr., Inc., 31 Colo. App. 373, 377, 504 P.2d
1113, 1115-16 (1972). In addition, the drafters of this Code section specifically stated their
purpose of protecting the consignee's creditors:
Pursuant to the general policies of this Act which require good faith not only
between the parties to the sales contract, but as against interested third parties,
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Predictably, section 2-326(3) has yielded a variety of judicial
interpretations as to the necessary elements for a "deemed sale or
return."'" For purposes of this Note, the new consignment
problemsI culminated in Walter E. Heller & Co. Southeast v. Rivi-
ana Foods, Inc. ,12 in which the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that a secret arrangement between an owner
of goods and the debtor-receiver of those goods sufficed to defeat
a creditor's claim against the debtor-receiver's inventory.' 3 Rivi-
ana effectively undermines the Code's goal of protecting creditors
who rely on the ostensible ownership of goods in their debtor's
possession.' 4 The decision not only creates new standards for pro-
tecting creditors in a situation which should have been treated as a
deemed sale or return transaction, but serves as a substantial set-
back in the continuing effort to clarify and systematize this disar-
rayed body of law.'5
This Note will address the difficulties inherent in consignment
transactions.' 6 A discussion of the judicial tests which developed
in the consignment/deemed sale or return area will follow, focus-
ing on those tests which were or could have been utilized in Rivi-
ana.'7 Finally, the Riviana decision will be analyzed in light of
the U.C.C. and prior judicial interpretations. 8
subsection (3) resolves all reasonable doubts as to the nature of the transaction in
favor of the general creditors of the buyer .... The purpose of the exception [set
out in subsections (3)(a)-(c)] is merely to limit the effect of the present subsection
itself.. . to cases in which creditors of the buyer may reasonably be deemed to
have been misled by the secret reservation.
U.C.C. § 2-326, Official Comment 2 (1978) (emphasis added).
10. The problems engendered by the consignment transaction, therefore, persisted
even after the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code. Indeed, "[t]he Code's handling
of consignments is fraught with uncertainty, and the Code cases on the subject clear up
little." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 22-4 at 883 (2d ed. 1980).
11. The phrase "new consignment problems" refers to those difficulties which have
arisen as a result of interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code's "deemed sale or
return." This is opposed to the "old" common law problems of consignments. See infra
notes 25-28 and accompanying text. Inasmuch as the Code does not define "consignment,"
however, and in light of U.C.C. § 1-103 (which retains all common law principles not
otherwise displaced by the Code), the Code-created problems may not all be recent devel-
opments, but merely recurring common law problems.
12. 648 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1981). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 92-146
and accompanying text.
13. 648 F.2d at 1062.
14. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 120-57 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 19-56 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 57-91 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 92-146 and accompanying text.
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Although the viability of the Fifth Circuit's holding is the cen-
tral issue, it should be noted that the predominant question is one
of statutory interpretation; uncertainty will persist as long as ex-
plicit provisions for the applicability of section 2-326(3) are
lacking.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Because of its diverse definitions, the term "consignment" has
been applied in a variety of situations. 9 A "consignment" is gen-
erally defined as the process of delivering goods to one who will
transmit them to a designated agent, or of depositing goods with
another, for disposition or careY° The typical common law appli-
cation of the word suggests an agency relationship wherein goods
are transferred by a consignor-principal and received by a con-
signee-agent for the consignor's benefit, for purposes of either sale
or care.
21
Some authorities imply that to effectuate a consignment, the
consignee must actually sell the goods received for the benefit of
the consignor.' Most definitions, however, are not so limited.23 At
19. This view is not unanimous in light of such statements as "[t]he [word]. . . 'con-
signment'... [has] a definite legal meaning universally understood in the business world
...." Charles M. Stieff, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 130 Tex. 594, 601, 111 S.W.2d 1086,
1090 (1938). But see Winship, The "True" Consignment Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, and Related Peccadilloes, 29 Sw. LJ. 825, 825 n.l (1975) (discussing the difficulties
encountered by the Uniform Commercial Code drafters in negotiating among themselves
the true meaning of a "true" consignment).
20. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 278 (5th ed: 1979). The common English definiton
is "to commit, to entrust ... to deliver into the care and control of another." Ryttenberg
v. Schefer, 131 F. 313, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1904). It has also been suggested that, depending on
the circumstances, "consignment" can be synonymous with "shipment.' Commonwealth
v. Harris, 168 Pa. 619, 627, 32 A. 92, 94 (1895).
21. As one court has observed, "a consignment of goods ... does not pass the title at
any time, nor does it contemplate that it should be passed. The very term implies an
agency, and that the-title is in the consignor, the consignee being his agent." Rio Grande
Oil Co. v. Miller Rubber Co., 31 Ariz. 84, 87, 250 P. 564, 565 (1926); see BENDER, supra
note 3, § 11.03[2].
22. Eg., Sturm v. Boker, 150 U.S. 312 (1893). Although the Court specifically stated
that a consignment existed where property was delivered "for care or sale," id. at 329 (em-
phasis added), the consignee was in fact to sell the goods for the consignor. Id. at 326. See
also 2 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS § 317 at 252 (rev. ed. 1948)
(indicating that the "ordinary" common law consignment involved a power to sell by the
agent-consignee). But see In re Novak, 7 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 196 (Md. Cir.
Ct. 1969) (no consignment since no authority to sell and no sales actually made).
23. See supra notes 20 & 21 and accompanying text. This seemingly subtle distinction
between a delivery for sale and one that is not is discussed later in determining whether a
transaction constitutes a deemed sale or return under U.C.C. § 2-326(3). See infra notes
57-67 and accompanying text.
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common law, consignment is established when: (1) the consignor
retains title to the goods, (2) the goods are delivered by the con-
signor into the possession of a consignee, and (3) the consignee
retains possession of the goods until title is transferred through a
sale with a buyer.24 Thus, it is a change in possession which ef-
fects a consignment, not a change in ownership.
Prior to the promulgation of the Uniform Commercial Code in
1951,25 the prevalent problem with the consignment transaction
resulted from the fact that the consignment failed to pass any in-
terest whatsoever in the consigned property to the consignee.26
This was of particular significance to the consignee's creditors
claiming an interest in all property belonging to the consignee
upon the latter's default. If a creditor had extended credit to a
consignee relying upon the consignee's ostensible ownership of
goods in its possession, that creditor would be likely to find that
the supplier-consignor had insulated the goods from creditors'
claims.27 The common law result was that the retention of bare
legal title allowed the consignor to repossess his goods against the
claims of the consignee's creditors.28
The common law concepts of title were significantly modified
in the Uniform Commercial Code, which does not utilize the title
24. See Hawkland, Consignments Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Sales or Se-
curity?, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE CO-ORDINATOR ANNOTATED 395, 396-97 (1963),
reprinted inpart in 2 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 736-40 (1964).
25. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 10, at 4.
26. This arrangement, therefore, was said to have created in the consignor's retained
title both "the sword of reclamation and the shield against execution." W. HAWKLAND,
supra note 24, at 396.
27. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, at 883; Harrington, supra note 1, at 436;
Comment, Uniform Commercial Code-Sale or Return--Creditors' Rights Under Section 2-
326, 54 IowA L. REV. 885, 886 (1969).
28. In response to this unjust treatment afforded third parties who relied on the osten-
sible ownership by consignees-agents in possession of their consignors'-principals' goods,
factors' acts were passed by state legislatures. For a concise explanation of the develop-
ment of factors' acts in England and the United States, see S. WILLISTON, supra note 22,
§§ 318-320; Conant, The Objective Theory of Agency: Apparent Authority and the Estoppel
ofApparent Ownership, 47 NED. L. REV. 678, 693-703 (1968). Nonetheless, consignors with
undisclosed interests continued to prevail. See, e.g., Ludvigh v. American Woolen Co., 231
U.S. 522 (1913) (consignment agreement was entered into in good faith between consignor
and consignee; consignor prevailed against trustee in bankruptcy). This common law de-
velopment was later criticized as creating "a secret lien against creditors of a shaky con-
signee, as harmful as an unfiled chattel mortgage or conditional sale." Liebowitz v.
Voiello, 107 F.2d 914, 916 (2d Cir. 1939); see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 10, at
883.
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concept in resolving sales problems.29 This change affected not
only sales transactions,30 but consignments as well.3'
Rather than concentrating solely on the location of title to for-
mulaically determine whose claim would be successful, the Code
has taken another approach in dealing with the problem engen-
dered by the consignment transaction.32  The U.C.C. generally
requires that where a person seeks a "security interest ' 33 in prop-
erty, that person take various steps to assure the creation and
maintenance of that interest. Respecting consignments, where the
consignor intends to retain such an interest in property, the trans-
action is deemed a "security consignment," and is governed by
Article 9 of the Code.34  This is distinguished from the "price-
fixing" consignment, otherwise known as a "true" consignment,
which involves no security interest and is subject to Article 2 of
the Code governing sales transactions. 35 Both of these transac-
29. See Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hayes, 276 N.C. 620, 632, 174 S.E.2d 511, 518
(1970).
30. The U.C.C. states that "[e]ach provision of Article 2 with regard to the rights,
obligations and remedies of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third parties applies
irrespective of tile to the goods except where the provision refers to such title." U.C.C. § 2-
401 (1978) (emphasis added).
31. Perhaps the provision which displays the greatest departure from the traditional
title concepts in the consignment area is the "modem factors' act" codified at U.C.C. § 2-
403(2) (1978). This section protects third parties who buy consigned goods from an agent-
consignee by emp6wering the consignee-dealer in those goods to transfer all of the con-
signors rights in the property to a buyer in the ordinary course of business. For purposes of
the issue presented at supra note 23 and accompanying text, and at infra note 42 and ac-
companying text, it should be noted that no authority to sell is required under this provi-
sion. Rather, since the principal-consignor creates an apparent authority situation by
utilizing as a consignee one who deals in the same types of goods, the consignor's goods
will be subject to third party claims. See Conant, supra note 28, at 701-03.
32. Since the U.C.C. does not suggest an alternative definition, the common law usage
of "consignment," as developed at notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text, can be rea-
sonably employed for Code purposes pursuant to U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978). Note, Commercial
Transactions: U C. C. § 2-326. Sale or Return and Consignment Transactions-Rights of
Creditors in Return Shipment, 33 OKLA. L. REv. 118, 124 (1980).
33. The retention of title by an owner is equated with the retention of a "security
interest"-- "an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or perform-
ance of an obligation." U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1978).
34. U.C.C. §§ 9-101 to -507 (1978). The U.C.C. test for a "security consignment" is
subjective, focusing on the parties' intent to determine the type of consignment involved.
"Unless a ... consignment is intended as security, reservation of title thereunder is not a
'security interest'. . . ." U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1978) (emphasis added).
35. Even though the distinction holds no immediate importance for this discussion, a
number of noteworthy commentators have analyzed the differences between the two types
of consignments and the varying treatment of each under the Code. See BENDER, supra
note 3, ch. I Ipassim; Duesenberg, Consignment Distribution Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code: Code, Bankruptcy, and Antitrust Considerations, 2 VAL. U.L. REv. 227 (1968);
W. HAWKLAND, supra note 24. Although it superficially appears to be an instinctive deci-
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tions are always subject to interpretation under section 2-326.36
Section 2-326(3) is based on the principle of ostensible owner-
ship and seeks to protect innocent creditors of the consignee.37
This protection is generated through the interaction of two section
2-326 provisions. First, section 2-326(2) provides that in a sale or
return transaction, the goods will be subject to the claims of the
buyer's creditors where the buyer is in possession of those goods.38
Second, section 2-326(3) specifies that a consignment transaction
will be deemed a sale or return transaction.39 In effect, then, a
consignment transaction is treated as a sale transaction, even
though the primary requirement of a sale-the passage of ti-
tle-has not occurred.4" Section 2-326(3) thus allows the creditor
to assume that the consignee owns the consigned goods, because
in its dealings with the creditor, the consignee is treated as owner.
Since the Code considers only the objective nature of the
transaction, the parties' subjective intentions are irrelevant in dis-
tinguishing a sale transaction from a consignment.4 If the objec-
sion, the determination of whether a consignment is "true" or "intended as security" is not
a mechanical test, since combinations of the price-fixing and security functions may be
intended by the parties. Uniform Commercial Code Commentary, Consignments, Creditors'
Rights and U.C.C. Section 2-326, 9 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 62, 65 (1967).
36. The effect of the Code's subjective test set out at U.C.C. § 1-201(37) is that all
consignments are subject to interpretation under § 2-326(3), but only those consignments
intended as security are subject to the stringent requirements of Article 9. Thus, an exten-
sive amount of litigation revolves around the nature of the consignment in question in
order to determine which Code provisions are applicable. See BENDER, supra note 3,
§ 11.02[l].
37. See supra note 9. This section's fundamental purpose has been described by a
leading U.C.C. scholar as follows:
Regardless of the legal theory of the consignment, in practical operation it looks
like a sales transaction in which the unpaid seller retains a secret lien in his goods.
From a creditor's point of view, the consigned goods appear to be part of the
regular inventory of the consignee which, therefore, ought to be subject to their
claims. What is more, unlike a pre-code chattel mortgage, there is no public filing
or other notoriety respecting the consignment to warn the creditors that the con-
signor may have rights in the goods which are superior to theirs.
The Code drafters were apparently much impressed that the consignment situ-
ation could be terribly misleading to creditors of the consignee. So, while the
Code permits the consignment transaction to continue, it declares that the con-
signment will be valid as against creditors only if there is some way by which
creditors can learn of the consignment.
Shanker, Bankruptcy and Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 89 N.J.L.J. 648, 648
(1966), quoted in In re Gross Mfg. & Importing Co., 328 F. Supp. 905, 909 (D.N.J. 1971).
38. U.C.C. § 2-326(2) (1978). This section is set forth in full at supra note 5.
39. U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1978). This section is set forth in full at supra note 5.
40. See supra note 8.
41. Bufkor, Inc. v. Star Jewelry Co., 552 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); 1 R. AN-
DERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-326:4 at 409 (2d ed. Supp. 1981); [6C Reporter-
Digest] BENDER'S U.C.C. SERV. (MB) § 2-326 at 357 (Supp. Oct. 1981); Note, Sale or Re-
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tive criteria are met, therefore, the appearance of ownership is
created and a deemed sale or return will be found. These requi-
site criteria are: the delivery of goods by the owner-consignor to a
person "for sale,"4 2 to a location where the latter deals in goods of
the same kind,4 3 and the receiver-consignee's use of its own name,
rather than that of the owner-consignor, in dealing with the
goods.44
A deemed sale or return will not be found, and a belief in the
ostensible ownership of goods will be deemed unreasonable, if the
owner-consignor has taken the precautionary steps required by
statute to warn others of its retention of title in the goods. These
steps are: (1) the consignor must comply with the law in those few
states which have determined that the posting of a sign suffices to
indicate retained ownership,45 (2) the consignor must show that
the consignee's creditors generally know that a substantial portion
of the consignee's business involves the sale of similar goods
which are owned by others,46 and (3) the consignor must fulfill the
Article 9 public filing requirement 7.4  Through these exceptions,
the U.C.C. specifies when a creditor is not "deemed to be
turn . Consignment - The Intention ofthe Parties i No Longer Determinatipe of the Issue,
24 BAYLOR L. REv. 288 (1972).
42. See U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1978), set forth in full at supra note 5. One of the contro-
versies discussed in this Note concerns the meaning of the words "for sale," and particu-
larly whether it is necessary for the receiver of the goods to actually sell them, whether
express actual authority to sell is required, or whether neither factor need be present for the
goods to have been delivered "for sale." See infra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
43. See U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1978), set forth in full at supra note 5.
44. Id.
45. U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(a) (1978). The use of a sign-posting law has been criticized as
ineffective for providing sufficient notice. See, e.g., King, Current Problems in the Sales
Area, 2 U.C.C.L.L 228, 231-32 (1969). In addition, the posting of a sign compiles with this
section only if state law provides for sign posting. In re Levy, 3 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CAL-
LAGHAN) 291 (E.D. Pa. 1965). Howevet, only two states have effective sign-posting stat-
utes. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-3-7 (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-72 (1975).
46. U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(b) (1978). The drafters' reason for including this exception was
that if the consignee's creditors knew generally that a substantial part of the consignee's
business involved selling the goods of others, that creditor seeking § 2-326(3) protection
could not have been "reasonably" misled by the consignment. See supra note 9. Since this
is often difficult for the consignor to prove, the exception is unattractive in most instances.
See Guardian Discount Co. v. Settles, 114 Ga. App. 418, 422, 151 S.E.2d 530, 534 (1966).
47. U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(c) (1978). This is the most effective method available to an
owner of goods, since filing furnishes actual and constructive notice of a retained owner-
ship in goods possessed by another. Also, it is the fairest method from the creditor's per-
spective, since the public record can always be verified on any particular date (unlike sign-
posting), and the inquiry process itself is simplified (unlike the process of determining the
general knowledge of all of consignee's creditors).
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deceived"4 8 by a consignor into believing that the consignee owns
the goods in its possession and has the power to dispose of them,
by sale or otherwise, as the latter so desires.49
Some commentators have suggested that section 2-326(3) was
designed to compromise the owner-consignor's interest in its
goods while affording protection to the creditor who relied on its
debtor's (i.e., the consignee's) ostensible ownership.50 Although
the section balances the conflicting interests of the consignor and
the creditor,51 there is no evidence of compromise in section
2-326(3). If the transaction creates the appearance of ownership
by satisfying the objective criteria described above,52 and the con-
signor has not protected its interest in the goods by complying
with the notoriety exceptions,53 the consignor's claim of ownership
will be subordinated to a creditor's claim.
Ambiguous statutes are likely to result in a variety of interpre-
tations, particularly where, as here, a uniform statute has been
promulgated for nationwide adoption.54 With respect to the inter-
pretation of section 2-326(3), the recent Fifth Circuit decision in
Walter E Heller & Co. Southeast v. Riviana Foods, Inc. 5' adds a
new dimension to resolving the issue of whether a transaction is a
deemed sale or return. The result of the decision was to defeat the
creditor's claim, despite the ostensible ownership by the debtor in
the goods it held for another.
Riviana hinges on the ambiguity in section 2-326(3) that goods
be "delivered to a person for sale" if a deemed sale or return
transaction is to be found. By limiting the interpretation of the
words "for sale" to denote actual sales or express actual authority
to make those sales, the Fifth Circuit has undercut the extent to
which section 2-326(3) applies to consignment transactions.56
48. See supra note 9 (last sentence of U.C.C. § 2-326, Official Comment 2 (1978)).
49. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
50. Uniform Commercial Code Commentary, supra note 35, at 63.
51. See supra notes 27 & 28 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
54. To illustrate, every state, with the exception of Louisiana, has adopted § 2-326(3),
and none has specifically treated the definitional problem engendered by the term "for
sale." See supra note 42.
55. 648 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1981).
56. The Official Comments to the section, set forth at supra note 9, state that the pur-
pose of the three exceptions to § 2-326(3) is to determine the conditions under which a
creditor is "deemed to have been misled." U.C.C. § 2-326 Official Comment 2 (1978).
Thus, if the conditions of § 2-326(3) are met, and none of the exceptions is applicable due
to noncompliance by the consignor, a creditor will be "deemed to have been misled."
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Before examining the Riviana decision, however, this Note will
consider the judicial interpretation of those specific provisions of
section 2-326(3) which were at issue in Riviana as well as the
deemed sale or return test as developed by the pre-Riviana
decisions.
II. TESTS FOR DETERMINING A DEEMED SALE OR RETURN
UNDER U.C.C. SECTION 2-326(3)
Two major tests are employed to determine whether a transac-
tion constitutes a deemed sale or return for purposes of section
2-326(3). Under the criteria for misleading the creditor, a creditor
can rely on the consignee's ostensible ownership to demonstrate
the existence of a deemed sale or return. The distinct component
test searches for the presence of a component in the final sales
price reflecting payment for the consignee's services.
A. Misleading the Creditor Criteria
1. The Authority to Sell Requirement
The most controversial element of a deemed sale or return
transaction is that the person receiving the goods actually sell or
be given express actual authority to sell those goods.57 Although
this controversy existed long before the promulgation of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, a solution was easily reached where the
situation gave the appearance of ownership by the consignee.
Thus, it was said that
if a person authorize another to assume the apparent right of
disposing of property in the ordinary course of trade, it must be
presumed that the apparent authority is the real authority....
[Therefore, if] the principal send his commodity to a place,
None of the conditions specifies, among other things, that actual sales must be consum-
mated or that express actual authority to sell must be given before a creditor is considered
to have been legally misled. Not only do these requirements create an extra-statutory limi-
tation, but they also fail to take into account the ostensible ownership situation which leads
third parties to believe that sales have been made or authority to sell has been given.
Therefore, when a consignor fails to implement one of the statutorily-defined procedures
for informing others that what they see is not to be believed (since the "apparent owner"
has no express actual authority to sell the goods in his possession), the consignor should be
estopped from recovering against one who has been "deemed to have been misled." For
further discussion regarding an expansive interpretation of the term "for sale" in § 2-326(3)
to include the apparent-authority-to-sell situation, see infra notes 58-67 and accompanying
text.
57. This authority to sell requirement presumably arises from the statutory mandate
that the goods be delivered to a dealer in those goods "for sale." See General Elec. Co. v.
Pettingell Supply Co., 347 Mass. 631, 199 N.E.2d 326 (1964).
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where it is the ordinary business of the person to whom it is
confided to sell, it must be intended that the commodity was
sent thither for the purpose of sale.58
So long as the owner of goods intentionally or carelessly created
an appearance of ownership in another by delivering those goods
to, or allowing continued possession by, a person who ordinarily
deals in goods of a similar kind, no express actual authority to sell
was necessary to create a deemed sale or return.59 The Uniform
Commercial Code maintained this treatment of ostensible
ownership.6 o
The first reported decision specifically interpreting the author-
ity to sell problem was General Electric Co. v. Pettingell Supply
Co.61 In Pettingell, a lamp manufacturer delivered a number of
lamps to its wholesaler, a dealer in goods of this kind, either for
sale by the wholesaler directly or for delivery to customers of vari-
ous retail agents. The court determined that the goods had been
delivered to the dealer "for sale," and were therefore subject to
claims of the dealer's creditors under section 2-326(3), by reason-
ing that some authority to sell the lamps had been given, even
though all of the lamps were not sold by the consignee.62
58. Pickering v. Busk, 104 Eng. Rep. 758, 760 (1812).
59. For a progression of the case law in this area, see citations in P. MECHEM, OUT-
LINES OF AGENCY §§ 112-122 (4th ed. 1952).
60. The Uniform Commercial Code's policy of applying ostensible ownership princi-
ples to sales transactions resulted in the adoption of § 2-403, Power to Transfer; Good Faith
Purchase of Goods; Entrusting. This section was promulgated to protect persons who buy
in the ordinary course of business from a dealer's inventory. The drafters determined that
the power granted under this section to those who deal in goods to transfer all rights (in-
cluding title) was not inconsistent with the expectations of either consignors or creditors,
"since the very purpose of goods in inventory is to be turned into cash by sale." U.C.C. § 2-
403, Official Comment 2 (1978). Subsections 2-403(2) and (3) provide as follows:
(2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of
that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in
ordinary course of business.
(3) "Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of pos-
session regardless of any condition expressed between the parties to the deliv-
ery or acquiescence and regardless of whether the procurement of the
entrusting or the possessor's disposition of the goods have been such as to be
larcenous under the criminal law.
U.C.C. §§ 2-403(2)-(3) (1978).
61. 347 Mass. 631, 199 N.E.2d 326 (1964).
62. Only 26% of the lamps held by the consignee were "sold" directly to consumers.
Id. at 635, 199 N.E.2d at 329. In interpreting § 2-326's application to the case, the court
observed that reading § 2-326(l)(b), defining a "sale or return," with § 2-326(l)(a), defin-
ing a "sale on approval," "does not.., exclude a consignment of goods to be sold or to be
deliveredto other agents as orders may require." Id. (emphasis added). This statement may
appear misleading unless it is remembered that there are three separate transactions which
are treated in § 2-326. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. To clarify the matter,
this sentence might be paraphrased as follows: the subsections of § 2-326 determining a
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The Petingell court considered the applicability of section
2-326(3) in the event no actual sale by the consignee had been
made, and explicitly stated that it was unnecessary to find an ac-
tual "sale" before determining that the transaction was a deemed
sale or return.63 The court refused, however, to contemplate the
result in the event the sole authority given the consignee had been
to distribute, but not to sell, the lamps.' The effect of the court's
decision was to treat the consignee's entire inventory as part of a
deemed sale or return transaction subject to the creditor's claims,
even though only a fraction of the consigned goods were actually
sold by the consignee. Indeed, this may be the only reasonable
conclusion, since a consignee's "secret" arrangement with the con-
signor to sell none, part, or all of the goods does not diminish the
consignee's ostensible ownership, and should likewise not dimin-
ish the protection afforded creditors under section 2-326(3).65
To be consistent with the intent of the drafters of the Uniform
Commercial Code, section 2-326(3) should be applied to a wide
variety of situations where a creditor is "deemed to have been
misled" by the consignee's ostensible ownership of goods belong-
ing to the consignor.66 The need for expanded creditor protection
is particularly acute where the debtor deals not only in the type of
goods involved, but also agrees to act as a delivery agent-con-
signee with respect to goods owned by another. 67 Where there is
"sale or return" and a "sale on approval" do not prohibit finding a "deemed sale or return"
where goods have been consigned for the purpose of delivery.
63. The court stated that "subsection [2-326(3),] by its terms [is] concerned with cer-
tain transactions which, although they may not be sales under the definition of. . . § 2-
106(1), are nonetheless 'deemed to be on sale or return' with respect to claims of creditors
of the person conducting the business .... " 347 Mass. at 633, 199 N.E.2d at 328. This
finding is entirely consistent with the concept of consignment which, by definition, passes
no title. See supra notes 20 & 21 and accompanying text.
64. 347 Mass. at 635, 199 N.E.2d at 329.
65. Recent Developments, Commercial Transactions.- UCC Section 2-326 and Credi-
tor's Rights to Consigned Goods, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 547 (1965). But see infra note 76 and
accompanying text.
66. See supra note 9 (last sentence of U.C.C. § 2-326, Official Comment 2 (1978)).
67. The result of broadly applying § 2-326(3) to this situation was applauded in In re
Novak, 7 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 196 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1969). In Novak, business
machines had been delivered by a manufacturer to the debtor, a repairer of such machines,
for demonstration, as loans to previous purchasers during the period of their machine's
repair, and for delivery against sales orders. The court found a deemed sales or return
transaction since as § 2-326(3) "includes transactions in which the goods are delivered at
least in great part for ultimate resale." Id. at 201 (emphasis added). See also Grady v.
Gennett, 31 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 83 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (holding as irrelevant
whether consignor left goods with debtor primarily for the purpose of free storage or sale in
determining applicability of §,2-326(3)). Contra Taylor Mobile Homes v. Founders Inv.
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no objective indication that the debtor owns one particular good
in his possession as distinguished from another, the authority to
sell requirement should have no bearing on the viability of the
creditor's claim. For one thing, the ease with which a consignor
can indicate its ownership of the goods negates the need for such a
requirement. Another factor militating against this requirement is
that it places an undue burden on the creditor to uncover the
existence of a secret arrangement between the consignor and con-
signee concerning the authority (or lack thereof) to sell. Such an
onus would neglect the legitimate claims of the consignee's
creditor.
2. The Commingling of Goods by the Consignee
Section 2-326(3) is premised on the notion that a creditor
should be able to rely on the ostensible ownership of the goods
held by its debtor, unless the creditor possesses actual or construc-
tive knowledge to the contrary resulting from the consignor's com-
pliance with the notoriety exceptions.68 In the context of a
deemed sale or return, ostensible ownership may be evidenced by
the consignee's commingling of consigned goods with those
owned and regularly dealt in by the consignee. 69 In such circum-
stances, unless some precaution has been taken to indicate a third
party's ownership of the goods, the creditor should not be penal-
ized for reasonably concluding that its debtor owns all that it ap-
pears to own. Thus, a consignor's sole assurance that the goods
delivered to a consignee will remain subject to the consignor's re-
Corp., 238 So. 2d 116 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that where mobile homes deliv-
ered "on consignment for display and retail sale," creditor's claim could not attach since
the homes were not subject of sale, and no creditor interest could arise merely from transfer
of possession). See generally Note, ConsignmenIs Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 39
UMKC L. REv. 274 (1971) (analysis of Taylor Mobile Homes and determination that had
the court considered § 2-326(3), a deemed sale or return transaction would have been
found).
68. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. As one commentator aptly notes,
"people should be able to deal with a debtor upon the assumption that all property in his
possession is unencumbered, unless the contrary is indicated by their own knowledge or by
public records." W. HAWKLAND, supra note 24 and accompanying text.
69. The duty of the consignee to prevent commingling of the goods received in a con-
signment has long generated interest. Prior to the passage of such protective statutes as
U.C.C. § 2-326(3), or the pre-U.C.C. factors' acts, the consignee's creditors did not fare
well despite the commingling and appearance of ownership by the consignee. See S. WiL-
LISTON, supra note 22, § 338 at 304-05. This, however, is not always the case today. See,
e.g., Modular Hous. Inc. v. G.A.C. Trans-World Acceptance Corp., 288 Ala. 77, 257 So.2d
326 (1972) (transaction held to be a deemed sale or return where mobile homes were deliv-
ered by manufacturer to dealer and commingled on dealer's lot).
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tained ownership interest, irrespective of the consignee's treatment
of those goods (including the commingling of the consignee's own
goods with those of the consignor) is by compliance with the noto-
riety exceptions of section 2-326(3).7 0
The commingling of goods by a consignee would most likely
result in creditor deception in the absence of some form of notifi-
cation as to the true ownership of those goods. However, it may
not be necessary for the consignor's goods to be physically inter-
mingled with the consignee's goods in order to establish ostensible
ownership in the consignee .7  Application of section 2-326(3) in
this circumstance, although appropriate in light of the stated pur-
pose of this section,72 emphasizes the extent to which a creditor
should be protected. If the consignor fails to take advantage of
one of the three section 2-326(3) safeguards to assure protection of
the retained ownership interest,73 the creditor will be "deemed to
have been misled," whether or not commingling of goods has
occurred.74
3. The Individual Versus the Commercial Consignor Distinction
Different judicial rules have evolved in the deemed sale or re-
turn area where an individual, as opposed to a commercial, con-
signor is involved, despite the identical illusory effect on the
creditor of ostensible ownership. The result has been that even in
those cases where the court has found a sale or return, as in All-
geier v. Campisi,75 or a deemed sale or return transaction, as in
70. See Modular Hous. Inc., 288 Ala. 77, 257 So. 2d 326 (1972); see supra notes 45-47
and accompanying text.
71. Manufacturers Acceptance Corp. v. Penning's Sales, Inc., 5 Wash. App. 501, 487
P.2d 1053 (1971). In Manufacturers Acceptance Corp., a retailer agreed with supplier to
hold the latter's paint and ship it to dealers upon the supplier's direction. The paint was
stored in rear of consignee's store; retail operations continued in the store proper. A secur-
ity agreement containing an after-acquired property clause was entered into between the
retailer and the creditor, prior to shipment of the paint by the supplier to retailer. The
court labeled this a deemed sale or return transaction, not a mere warehousing transaction.
Id. at 506, 487 P.2d at 1057. Since the supplier had not complied with one of the stated
exceptions to § 2-326(3), all the goods, both in front and back of the retailer's store, were
subject to the creditor's claim.
72. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 56.
75. 117 Ga. App. 105, 159 S.E.2d 458 (1968). An automobile owner inAllgeier placed
the car in the dealer's lot for solicitation of purchase offers and expressly reserved the right
to reject any bids. The court found no sale or return transaction, and the car was therefore
not subject to the claims of the dealer's creditor since the dealer was not a "buyer." The
Ailgeler court was sharply criticized for its failure to consider the implications of
§ 2-326(3). Had the court done so, it is argued that a deemed sale or return transaction
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Founders Investment Corp. v. Fegett,76 the individual consignor
can successfully recover the consigned goods, even though no at-
tempt was made to prevent creditor deception.7 7 The rationale for
this contrary result in the case of a noncommercial consignor is
that the parties neither intended nor contemplated a transfer of
ownership in the goods by the transfer of possession, and the lit-
eral application of section 2-326(3) would produce harsh results to
the individual consignor who is unsophisticated in technical com-
mercial matters.78
The inherent difficulty with the individual/commercial con-
signor distinction is that it is totally unsupported by section
2-326(3), since that section is equally applicable to all deliverers of
goods.79 Additionally, the dichotomy allows a subjective test to be
applied to the virtual disregard of the preferable objective crite-
ria. 0 It is not surprising, therefore, that this distinction has been
rejected in such cases as Bischoffv. Thomasson.81 There, the court
would have been found. See Note, Consignments Under the Uniform Commercial
Code-How SafeAre They?, 7 AM. Bus. L.J. 304, 305 (1970).
Furthermore, not all authorities have agreed with the.Ailgeler court's concept of "sale,"
particularly since ".U.C.C. § 2-326(3) is designed to embrace certain transactions which,
although not deemed to be sales within § 2-106(1), are deemed to be a sale or return with
respect to the claims of creditors of persons to whom the goods are delivered." I R. AN-
DERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-326:3, at 777 (2d ed. 1970); see also BENDER,
supra note 3, § 11.03[3], at 11-47 (requirement in § 2-326(3) that a consignee "deals in
goods" need not mean a sale for purposes of ascertaining existence of deemed sale or re-
turn transaction).
76. 23 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 903 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). The court in Fegett
determined that the "mere placing" of a mobile home with a dealer for the purpose of
obtaining offers, but with no authority given to the dealer to sell, was not a sale or return
under § 2-326. Id. at 906. This result was based on the "unjust and unwise" effect § 2-326
would have on "an individual owner, as distinguished from a commercial one. ... Id.
(emphasis supplied). The court also believed that transactions of this type were so infre-
quent that commercial creditors would not be oppressed as a result of this opinion. Id.
77. See supra note 56.
78. The intent approach has been severely criticized by the commentators, since
"[s]ection 2-326(3) is not based on intent but rather objective circumstances to characterize
a delivery as on sale or return with respect to the dealer's creditors. . . .Apparently the
court [in Fegelt, by using this approach,] was more concerned with the harshness of al-
lowing consumers to be subjected to a provision which it feels should be restricted to trans-
actions between commercial parties." [6C Reporter-Digest] (part 2) BENDER'S U.C.C.
SERV. (MB), § 2-326, at 146 (Supp. Oct. 1982).
79. See U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1978).
80. See supra note 78.
81. 400 So. 2d 359 (Ala. 1981). The court criticized both Ailgeler and Fegett as "mav-
erick" cases, adding that "[i]f the drafters of [§ 2-326] had intended to limit its scope to
commercial consignors, they could have inserted a limiting phrase such as 'between
merchants.'" Id. at 367.
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described the test to be applied in the case of an individual con-
signor as follows:
The test is simply one of looking at the outwardly visible as-
pects of the transaction outlined in [section 2-326(3)], viz.: (1)
delivery of possession to the consignee, (2) engaging in the
business of selling such types of items by the consignee, and (3)
failure of the consignor to give public notice of his retained in-
terest in the goods.12
Thus, since the individual/commercial distinction appears to be a
weak excuse for applying a test which unquestionably operates to
the detriment of the consignee's creditors and, therefore, in dero-
gation of section 2-326(3), s3 there is little reason to perpetuate its
use. Accordingly, whether a consignor is an individual or a com-
mercial organization should not be considered in determining
whether a transaction is a deemed sale or return.
4. Extending Credit Only After Consignment is Effected
The last requirement for misleading the creditor and qualify-
ing for section 2-326(3) protection is that the creditor extend credit
to the debtor-consignee after the consignee acquires possession of
the goods.8 4 A corollary to this requirement is that if the creditor
actually knew that the goods in the consignee's possession were
owned by the consignor at the time credit was extended, those
goods will not be subject to the creditor's section 2-326(3) claims,
since the creditor could not have been misled by the consignor's
failure to warn."5 The rationale for these requirements is that a
creditor can rely on the argument of ostensible ownership only
after it appears that someone other than the actual owner has title
to the goods. These latter requirements constrict the full range of
situations to which section 2-326(3) applies, since the Code gener-
ally does not require an actual misleading of the creditor. Instead,
the consignor's goods are subject to a creditor's claim where the
consignor has failed to take the requisite precautions to prevent a
82. Id. at 367. The objective test was also used in Bufkor, Inc. v. Star Jewelry Co., 552
S.W.2d 522 (rex. Civ. App. 1977) (intention of parties in determining whether transaction
was consignment or sale irrelevant for purposes of § 2-326; creditor can treat transaction as
sale to possessor unless consignor adhered to notoriety exceptions). But see American Nat'l
Bank v. Etter, 28 Colo. App. 511, 476 P.2d 287 (1970) (dominant purpose of the delivery
determined whether transaction was sale or return).
83. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
84. See, eg., Clark Oil & Ref. Co. v. Liddicoat, 65 Wis. 2d 612, 618, 223 N.W.2d 530,
533 (1974).
85. See, ag., GBS Meat Indus. Pty. Ltd. v. Kress-Dobkin Co., 474 F. Supp. 1357
(W.D. Pa. 1979).
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situation where the creditor is "deemed to have been misled." 6
Where the security agreement between the consignee-debtor
and the creditor contains an after-acquired property clause, the
timing of the extension of credit is of little concern, since the
agreement stipulates that any property which subsequently is to
become a part of the consignee's inventory is also to be subject to
the creditor's claims, whether or not the creditor actually has
knowledge of or relies on the consignee's ownership of those
goods. Under these circumstances, the requirement that the credi-
tor rely specifically on those particular goods held by the con-
signee is relaxed and the creditor's claim will succeed so long as
the consignor failed to comply with the section 2-326 notoriety
87provisions.
B. The Distinct Component Test
Although not widely adopted by courts for determining the
existence of deemed sales or returns, the distinct component test,
raised in Vonins, Inc. v. Raff,s8 is applicable to the analysis of the
transaction occurring in Riviana. 9
In Vonins, a consignee-installer was engaged by a consignor-
supplier of plumbing and heating equipment as a subcontractor
under a number of installment contracts. The consignee received
a percentage of the total billings under the contracts in payment
for his labor. In an action to determine the interest of the con-
signor and the assignee for the benefit of the consignee's creditors
in the supplies, the court found section 2-326(3) to be applicable
since the goods had been delivered to the consignee "for sale" to
others.90 In reaching its determination, the court noted that
[a]t all times in which [the consignee] was engaged in opera-
tions, it performed the same method of distribution of equip-
ment from manufacturer to ultimate user .... Even though
an over-all price would be charged for the installation of the
equipment, it cannot be denied, that the price of the equipment
installed was a distinct component of that consideration. Thus,
86. See supra note 56.
87. See Sussen Rubber Co. v. Hertz, 19 Ohio App. 2d 1, 249 N.E.2d 65 (1969) (after-
acquired property clause in security agreement extended creditor's claim to property in
deemed sale or return transaction); Clark Oil & Ref. Co. v. Liddicoat, 65 Wis. 2d 612, 223
N.W.2d 530 (1974) (claim of attaching creditor given priority even though credit was ex-
tended to debtor-consignee before it possessed consignor's goods and creditor could, there-
fore, not have relied on debtor's ostensible ownership).
88. 101 N.J. Super. 172, 243 A.2d 836 (1968).
89. See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
90. 101 N.J. Super. at 181, 243 A.2d at 841.
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[the consignor] delivered goods to [the consignee] "for sale" to
others. That resale need not have been consummated at [the
consignee's] premises for the statute to apply.91
The essence of the distinct component test, thus, is that where the
final purchase price to an ultimate consumer contains as a "dis-
tinct component" an amount attributable to the consignee's serv-
ices with respect to the consigned goods, the goods will be
considered to have been delivered "for sale" by the consignor to
the consignee, and section 2-326(3) applies.
III. W.LTER E. HELLER & Co. SOUTHEAST V. RIvIANA
FOODS, INC. 92
On August 2, 1977, the predecessor in interest of Walter E.
Heller & Company Southeast Georgia ("Heller") entered into an
inventory loan security agreement with Bill Amos Brokerage Co.,
Inc. ("Debtor" or "Amos"). 93 Amos operated a warehouse facility
where it also engaged in a wholesale food distribution business as
both broker and merchant.94 The agreement between Heller and
Amos provided that Heller would make occasional loans to Amos
in an amount not to exceed a certain percentage of the value of
Amos' inventory either owned at the time of the loan or acquired
thereafter by Debtor.95 Subsequently, on January 22, 1979,
Debtor filed for voluntary bankruptcy.96 This triggered the de-
fault section under Heller's security agreement 97 and, in accord-
ance with the applicable provisions of that agreement, Heller
sought to take possession of Amos' entire inventory.98
Unknown to Heller at the time of its agreement with Debtor,99
Riviana Foods, Inc. ("Riviana"), a food supplier, had entered into
91. Id. at 181-82, 243 A.2d at 841-42.
92. 648 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1981).
93. As evidenced by the financing statements Heller filed with Florida's Secretary of
State, "Bill Amos Brokerage Co., Inc." was also doing business under the trade name
"Merchants Transfer and Storage Co." Complaint, Exhibit "C," Walter E. Heller & Co.
S.E. v. Riviana Foods, Inc., No. 79-403-CIV-J-B (M.D. Fla. July 18, 1980).
94. Brief for Appellant at 4, Walter E. Heller & Co. S.E. v. Riviana Foods, Inc., 648
F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1981).
95. 648 F.2d at 1060.
96. Id.
97. Complaint, "Exhibit A," at 5, Walter E. Heller & Co. S.E. v. Riviana Foods, Inc.,
No. 79-403-CIV-J-B (M.D. Fla. July 18, 1980).
98. Id. at 3.
99. Heller asserted that it had no knowledge of the relationship between Debtor and
Riviana until after Debtor had filed for bankruptcy. Reply Brief for Appellant at 3, Walter
E. Heller & Co. S.E. v. Riviana Foods, Inc., 648 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1981).
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an agreement with Debtor on February 4, 1976.100 Under the
agreement, Debtor was to act as a "delivery agent" for orders re-
ceived by Riviana for its grocery products, which were kept at
Debtor's warehouse facility. 01 In return, Debtor was to receive a
fixed percentage of the invoice price paid to Riviana.10 2 Soon af-
ter Debtor had filed for voluntary bankruptcy, Riviana removed
the goods it had stored with Debtor, worth approximately $23,000,
in which Heller claimed a security interest.10 3 The parties made
no provision for the sale of Riviana's goods by the debtor."°
Nonetheless, Riviana conceded that Debtor operated a place of
business under its own name at which it dealt in food goods. 105
Riviana also admitted that it took no steps whatsoever to evidence
its retained ownership interest in a portion of the goods held by
Debtor at the latter's facility. 0 6
A. Judicial Resolution
Based on these facts, the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida granted Riviana's motion for summary
judgment in an unpublished opinion. 0 7 The court determined
that the transaction between Riviana and Debtor was not a
deemed sale or return under the Florida equivalent of U.C.C. sec-
tion 2-326(3).108 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit subsequently affirmed this opinionper curiam.0 9
The principal issue in Riviana was whether the goods had been
delivered by Riviana to Debtor "for sale," since no specific au-
thority had been conferred upon Debtor to sell."0 The courts de-
termined that the present case was easily distinguishable from
100. 648 F.2d at 1059-60.
101. Answer Brief for Appellee at 2, Walter E. Heller & Co. S.E. v. Riviana Foods,
Inc., 648 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1981).
102. 648 F.2d at 1060.
103. Id.
104. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals, by itsper curiam adoption of
the District Court's opinion, believed that the distinction between authorization and prohi-
bition should affect the outcome of this case. Since there was no specific agreement permit-
ting the Debtor to sell, and since Debtor did not actually sell, both courts refused to further
consider the matter. 648 F.2d at 1063.
105. Id. at 1061.
106. Id.
107. Walter E. Heller & Co. S.E. v. Riviana Foods, Inc., No. 79-403-CIV-J-B (M.D.
Fla. July 18, 1980).
108. FLA. STAT. § 672.2-326(3) (1966).
109. 648 F.2d at 1059.
110. Id. at 1061.
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such cases as Pettingell" I and Pennings' Sales,112 where some au-
thority to sell had been given to the consignee. Instead, they re-
lied on Allgeier' 3 as applicable to this situation since no express
actual authority to sell had been given.'
4
The courts viewed section 2-326(3) as "strik[ing] a balance be-
tween the desire of the supplier to maintain an interest in his
goods and that of the creditor in relying on the apparent wealth of
his debtor."'1 5  Having failed to find a "sale" of the goods,' 16 the
balance was struck in favor of the owner of those goods. The
courts had difficulty with the fact that Heller had extended credit
to Debtor before any of the specific goods involved in the case
were shipped by Riviana to Debtor. Even though Riviana failed
to comply with the notoriety exceptions," 7 and despite the inclu-
sion of an after-acquired property clause in the security agreement
between Heller and Amos," 8 the courts found that the possibility
that Heller had been misled was only "minimal," and therefore,
"decline[d] to read § 2-326 literally." '
B. Riviana's AnalyticalAmbiguities
In light of the tests which have evolved to determine whether a
transaction is a deemed sale or return, there are a number of diffi-
culties with both courts' analyses in Riviana. Perhaps most signifi-
cant is the failure to find a "deemed misleading" of the creditor,
Heller, in light of Riviana's failure to comply with the notoriety
exceptions to section 2-326(3).120 The following section will apply
111. General Elec. Co. v. Pettingell Supply Co., 347 Mass. 631, 199 N.E.2d 326 (1964);
see supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
112. Manufacturers Acceptance Corp. v. Penning's Sales, Inc., 5 Wash. App. 501, 487
P.2d 1053 (1971); see supra note 71.
113. Allgeier v. Campisi, 117 Ga. App. 105, 159 S.E.2d 458 (1968); see supra note 75.
114. This is particularly remarkable in light of commentators' urgings that this case be
applied restrictively even where an individual consignor, rather than a commercial con-
signor like Riviana, is involved. See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
115. 648 F.2d at 1062. But see supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (illustrating
that this is not the intention of § 2-326(3)).
116. 648 F.2d at 1062. There is no requirement, however, that a sale must be effected
before a consignment or a deemed sale or return transaction is found. See supra note 63.
117. 648 F.2d at 1061.
118. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
119. 648 F.2d at 1062.
120. See supra note 56. It is particularly surprising to note that although no case has
been reported with Riviana's same fact pattern, one commentator treated this situation in
hypothetical form and concluded that "[t]he thrust of the decisions [considering application
of § 2-326(3)] would include this distribution technique . Winship, supra note 19, at
853.
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each test previously raised in this Note to the facts of Riviana, and
will discuss that decision's effect on the deemed sale or return
transaction.
1. Misleading the Creditor Criteria
a. The Authority to Sell Requirement. The Riviana courts
held that since express actual authority had not been given to
Debtor to sell the owner's goods, no deemed sale or return could
be found. 2' Recent cases and commentators have relaxed this re-
quirement, however, and have agreed that "ultimate" resale of the
consignor's goods is more consistent with the section 2-326 credi-
tor protection purpose. 22 That section does not specify that au-
thority to sell is necessary to result in creditor protection, nor do
the Official Comments so limit its application. 23 However, the
Official Comments do indicate that the consignee's creditors are to
be protected from secret reservations' 24 in ostensible ownership
situations. With this stated purpose as the impetus, it should be
clearly unnecessary to predicate deemed sales or returns upon the
conferral of express actual authority upon the consignee to sell.
b. The Commingling of Goods by the Consignee. Uncontro-
verted evidence was offered in Riviana that Riviana's goods which
were stored in Debtor's facility were not segregated from, but in-
stead were commingled with, goods owned by others which were
stored at that facility.' 25 Riviana admitted that it made no at-
tempt to notify Heller, in its capacity as Debtor's creditor, of its
ownership of goods in Debtor's warehouse.' 26 Nor could Debtor
demonstrate that its creditors knew of it as being substantially en-
gaged in selling others' goods. 127 Since it was conceded that
Debtor maintained a place of business at which it dealt in goods
of the kind involved, 2 ' it would appear that the criteria for find-
ing a deemed sale or return were met. 29 Furthermore, none of
the exceptions was applicable. 30
121. 648 F.2d at 1062-63.
122. See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 56.
124. U.C.C. § 2-326 Official Comment 2 (1978).
125. Deposition of william A. Hunnel, Military Sales Manager of Riviana Foods, Inc.,
at 54, noted in Brief for Appellant Heller at 4, supra note 94.
126. 648 F.2d at 1061.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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Although the commingling of goods alone would suffice to
produce a prima facie deceptive situation of ostensible ownership
for purposes of applying section 2-326(3), 1 1 it may only be neces-
sary that all the goods be stored under the same roof for a deemed
sale or return to be found.'32 Thus, by failing to consider that
Riviana's goods were in fact commingled with goods owned by
others in Debtor's facility, the courts in Riviana were rejecting a
long-established method for determining whether a creditor was
actually misled. Of course, it is unnecessary to pursue this level of
analysis, since Heller could "reasonably be deemed to have been
misled" by Riviana's failure to comply with the recognized excep-
tions to section 2-326(3).133
c. The Individual Versus the Commercial Consignor Distinc-
tion. In drawing a positive comparison with Allgeier,134 the Rivi-
ana courts stated that since "the debtor was authorized to act only
as agent of the owner,"'135 a deemed sale or return could not be
found.' 36 Not only does this conclusion upset the definition of a
consignment as an agency relationship,'37 but it also ignores the
individual versus commercial consignor dichotomy which dis-
tinguishes Allgeier from 1?iviana. In Riviana, an individual did
not innocently leave his family auto with the neighborhood car
dealer; instead, an experienced commercial food company 3 de-
livered its goods to an experienced commercial food broker and
merchant.'39 Unlike an individual consignor, who might arguably
require heightened protection by a court, 40 Riviana was in a bet-
ter position to take the precautions required under section 2-
326(3) than was any other party. Having failed to do so, it seems
hardly appropriate that a court would countenance Riviana's in-
131. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 9 & 56.
134. Allgeier v. Campisi, 117 Ga. App. 105, 159 S.E.2d 458 (1968); see supra note 75
and accompanying text.
135. 648 F.2d at 1062.
136. Id.
137. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
138. The Articles of Incorporation of Riviana Foods, Inc., were filed with the Secretary
of State of Delaware on April 29, 1946.
139. The Articles of Incorporation of Bill Amos Brokerage Co., Inc., were filed with the
Secretary of State of Florida on January 28, 1965.
140. This argument has subsequently been rejected even in the context of an individual
consignor. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
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action, which prevented its underlying ownership of the goods
from being suspected by anyone else.
In effect, the Riviana courts applied a subjective rather than
objective test to the facts of the case; the courts determined that
the parties did not intend a transfer of ownership interest, nor did
they intend for the goods to be treated as if "for sale" by Debtor.
Therefore, the courts reasoned, there could be no deemed sale or
return. The fault with this analysis is that it is of little legal signifi-
cance whether there was an actual transfer of ownership inter-
est, 141 nor does it matter what the parties actually intended.' 42
Rather, the test considers the objective circumstances which mani-
fest the appearance of ownership to others. Had this test been
applied, a deemed sale or return would have been found, since:
(1) possession of the goods had been transferred from the owner to
(2) another party which was engaged in the business of dealing in
goods of that kind, where (3) the owner had failed to give public
notice of its retained interest in the goods. 143
2. The Distinct Component Test
The Debtor in Riviana received six and one-half percent of the
sales price of each item subsequently sold by Riviana as payment
for its storage and delivery of the goods. 144 A percentage of the
overall sales price was also the compensation received by the con-
signee in Vonins 14 for the role it played in the handling and dis-
posing of consignor's goods.'t In both cases, the ultimate
purchase price to be paid by the consumer of the goods contained
as a "distinct component" an amount attributable to the consignee
for services rendered. In Vonins, this service was installation; in
Riviana, it was warehousing and delivering. Thus, it may be ar-
gued that where a person's activities substantially affect the final
sale price of goods, as was the case in Riviana, the goods were
141. It is not necessary that ownership vest in the consignee for a creditor's claim to
attach to goods possessed by the consignee. See, e.g., Sussen Rubber Co. v. Hertz, 19 Ohio
App. 2d 1, 249 N.E.2d 65 (1969). Indeed, § 2-326(2) itself states that "goods held on sale or
return are subject to [creditor's] claims while in the buyer's possession," U.C.C. § 2-326(2)
(1978) and so long as the factual prerequisites of § 2-326(3) are met, goods held by a con-
signee will be subject to a creditor's claims in a deemed sale or return transaction. See also
supra note 63 and accompanying text ("sale" is unnecessary for "deemed sale or return"
transaction).
142. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
144. 648 F.2d at 1060.
145. Vonins, Inc. v. Raff, 101 N.J. Super. 172, 243 A.2d 836 (1968).
146. Id. at 181-82, 243 A.2d at 841-42.
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delivered to such person "for sale," under the Vonins distinct com-
ponent test, and the provisions of section 2-326(3) should apply.
IV. CONCLUSION
Wholesale financing is often rendered chaotic due to the in-
ability to consistently perfect security interests. This difficulty
arises when "secret" consignors appear with a superior interest in
their debtors' inventory. 4 7 Unfortunately, Riviana perpetuates
this confusion. Indeed, the Riviana courts appear to have restruc-
tured the language of section 2-326(3), and effectively to have
sanctioned the use of secret arrangements by consignors.
Unlike the U.C.C.,' 48 Riviana requires authority to make
sales.149 Although the purpose of the Code is to minimize adverse
consequences to a consignee's creditors, 150 Riviana sets a new
standard which a creditor must meet before it can benefit from
section 2-326(3). Thus, unless a creditor can show that it was
more than minimally misled by the consignor's secret reserva-
tion,15 not even the consignor's failure to comply with the notori-
ety exceptions will preserve the creditor's claim.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Riviana is that the con-
signor there was unquestionably in the best position to protect it-
self. It had been in business for many years, and undoubtedly
could have stored its goods with another consignee which did not
deal in food goods itself. Alternatively, being a "sophisticated"
consignor, Riviana could have complied with the Article 9 filing
requirements. 52 In either event, it is certainly unsettling that an
experienced consignor is given added incentive to do nothing to
protect an undisclosed ownership interest while the subject goods
are creating the reasonable but inaccurate impression of ostensible
ownership.
147. Note, Consignments Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 UMKC L. REv. 274,
282 (1971).
148. Seesupra note 56. The Code does not specifically exclude the finding of a deemed
sale or return where the goods are delivered (as opposed to "sold") as orders may require.
See General Elec. Co. v. Pettingell Supply Co., 347 Mass. 631, 635, 199 N.E.2d 326, 329.
See supra note 62.
149. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
151. 648 F.2d at 1062 (a finding of minimal misleading, as it presents a quantitative
factor which is neither found in § 2-326(3) nor defined in the decision itself).
152. This was the only exception to § 2-326(3) available to Riviana. Florida does not
have an applicable sign-posting law by which a consignor can protect a retained ownership
interest. Nor was it possible for Riviana to show that the debtor, Amos, was generally
known by its creditors as being substantially engaged in selling the goods of others.
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Although the intent of the drafters of the Code seems clear, 5 3
the specific words which would prevent this abuse from recurring
are not found in section 2-326(3) itself. Perhaps substituting the
term "for purposes of sale" or "for ultimate sale" for the term "for
sale" would alleviate some of the confusion which has been per-
petuated.'54 By adding these words, it would no longer be neces-
sary to inquire whether the consignee sold the goods or held them
with the express actual authority to sell. Another alternative
might be to adopt a statutory test for determining whether the
creditor had been sufficiently misled to require the protection af-
forded by section 2-326(3).155 In light of the above comments,
however, it is doubtful that the drafters were anxious to create yet
another statutory test different than the one which now suffices to
determine a "deemed misleading."'' 56 Indeed, if the existing judi-
cial tests concerning the extent to which a creditor must be misled
were to be abandoned,'57 and the courts instead were to rely on
the terms of the statute itself, the intent of the drafters would be
followed and uniformity of interpretation of this section would
ensue. It should be apparent, however, that some action is neces-
sary to unify the decisions under section 2-326(3), and perhaps for
the first time, create some stability in the consignment area.
DEBORAH JANCO BROWN
153. See supra note 9.
154. This has been suggested by at least one other commentator. See, e.g., UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, Commentary, supra note 35, at 69 (suggesting that the section be
changed to include the phrase: "Where goods are delivered to a person for sale, or
distribution").
155. It is questionable whether this would be what the drafters had in mind. After all,
nothing in § 2-326(3) indicates that the individual creditor's thoughts bear any relevance.
The issue of knowledge is raised in the exception to § 2-326(3)(b) and applies only if the
consignee is "generally known by his creditors" to deal substantially in others' goods. Iron-
ically, this argument was raised in another case before the same District Court, involving
the same creditor and consignee-debtor as in Riviana. Walter E. Heller & Co. of Ga. v.
Lou Ana Foods, Inc., No. 79-460-CIV-J-B (M.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 1981). In that case, the
security agreement contained an after-acquired property clause. The creditor had daily
information available pertaining to the precise quantity of goods held by the debtor owned
by the consignor. Despite the availability of this information, the court concluded that the
consignor's claim was subordinate to that of the creditor since the former had not taken the
steps necessary to evidence its ownership as delineated in § 2-326(3)(a)-(c).
156. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 57-87 and accompanying text.
